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Abstract: This article analyzes the determinants of the tenure of cabinet members
in Korea and the United States from 1948 to 2013. It concentrates on three sets of
factors that can affect the tenure of cabinet members: the personal characteristics
of the cabinet member, his or her political characteristics, and the characteristics
of the president under whom the cabinet member serves. This article finds that
some of the personal and political characteristics of the cabinet member affect
the length of a minister’s tenure in Korea. However, these same characteristics
do not affect the length of tenure of cabinet members in the United States,
although the characteristics of the president do have an impact on the tenure
length of cabinet members in both Korea and the United States. The mix of a
presidential system with a parliamentary system in Korea perhaps accounts for
difference between the two countries. Therefore, this article raises the possibility
that the theories and practices of public administration and political science in
the United States may not be applicable in Korea.
Keywords: tenure, cabinet members, minister, secretary, president, political
appointment
INTRODUCTION
Cabinet ministers play a very significant role in making policy decisions and
implementing policies in government (Kim, 1994; Huber & Martinez-Gallardo, 2008).1
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They are largely responsible for the work of ministry and negotiate the primary policies
of government in cabinet meetings. Thus, their position has both a managerial aspect
and a political aspect (Keman, 1991; Hahm, Jung & Lee, 2013).
In spite of the importance of cabinet ministers to the government, the ministerial
tenure of Korea is very short. The average length of ministerial tenure in Korea is
about 13.84 months, much less than in many other countries. An excessively short
ministerial tenure may have costs, including undermining continuity in the government
and teamwork between ministries as well as within a ministry (Heclo, 1978; Wood &
Marchbanks, 2008). As a result, the president under whom a minister serves may lose
control over the bureaucracy.
Ministers are chosen for various reasons. Some ministers may stand out as experts
in the management of their field, and others may be very skilled at dealing with the
legislative branch. Newly appointed ministers are expected to perform their job better
than the former minister. Therefore, the tenure of ministers can be one of the indicators
of their performance (Berlinski, Dewan, & Dowding, 2007). To analyze the determinants
of the minister’s tenure may prove revelatory.
However, little is known about the determinants of the ministerial tenure in Korea.
The literature on ministers in Korea needs more systematic analysis. The Korean Con-
stitution states that the president serves as the leader of the executive branch, a provi-
sion deeply affected by the U.S. Constitution. In the United States, research shows that
while the characteristics of cabinet members have little impact on their tenure, the
characteristics of the president have a powerful impact (Cohen, 1986).
This article empirically examines the determinants of the tenure of cabinet members
in Korea and the United States from 1948 to 2013, employing the proportional hazards
model. It concentrates on three sets of factors that can affect the tenure of cabinet
members: the personal characteristics of a cabinet member, the political characteristics
of a cabinet member, and the characteristics of the appointing president. It finds that
some of the personal and political characteristics of the minister affect the length of
ministerial tenure in Korea. In contrast, the characteristics of the secretary do not
affect the length of secretarial tenure in the United States. However, the characteristics
of the president do have an impact on the tenure length of cabinet members in both
Korea and the United States.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. The next section outlines theoretical
arguments and describes a study design for testing the theory. The subsequent section
provides a descriptive analysis of ministerial composition in Korea and secretarial
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1. In the United States, holders of posts equivalent to ministers are called secretaries.
composition in the United States and examines the effects of individual characteristics
on hazard rates using the proportional hazards model. The last section discusses find-
ings and implications.
RESEARCH DESIGN
Theoretical Background and Hypothesis
There are significant differences between a presidential system and a parliamentary
system. One lies in the relationship among members of the cabinet. Many developed
democracies have a parliamentary system, but Korea has a presidential system, which
bears some similarity to the U.S. presidential system. When the National Assembly
drew up the Korean Constitution in 1948, the U.S. army military government in Korea
and Rhee Syngman, who worked for the independence of Korea from Japan for
almost 40 years in the United States, convinced assemblymen to adopt a presidential
system like that of the United States, which had been shaped by the U.S. Constitution
(Constitutional Court of Korea, 2014).
But there are important differences between the political system of Korea and that
of the United States. The term of office for the U.S. president is four years, and the
president can only serve two terms (Peabody & Gant, 1999). The United States Con-
gress is a bicameral legislature. In addition and most importantly, the federal system
prescribed by the Constitution is the dominant feature of the U.S. governmental system.
However, the presidential system of Korea has undergone several changes due to 
constitutional amendments. The president of Korea has been elected by direct popular
vote for a single five-year term since 1987.2 Before the constitutional amendment in
1987, the president could be reelected, and the presidential terms varied from four to
seven years. In addition, Korea has a unicameral legislature.
A variety of factors may affect the length of tenure of cabinet members. Cohen
(1986) argues that while the characteristics of U.S. secretaries have little effect on their
tenure, the characteristics of the president have a significant effect on it. Berlinski, Dewan,
and Dowding (2007) divide factors related to cabinet members into two categories:
personal characteristics and political characteristics.
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2. See articles 67 and 70 of the Korean Constitution.
Personal Characteristics of the Cabinet Member
First, the personal characteristics of the cabinet member appointed by the president
may affect the length of tenure. A minister’s performance is closely tied to his or her
ability, and that ability would be indirectly related to the characteristics of the minister.
Though the definition of a capable minister is a matter of debate, the characteristics 
of the minister, such as age, gender, educational background, and career pattern may
affect the minister’s ability to perform. And thus, the characteristics of the minister
may have an impact on ministerial tenure (Cohen, 1986; Berlinski, Dewan & Dowding,
2007). Following Berlinski, Dewan and Dowding (2007), this article splits the charac-
teristics of the minister into two categories, considering factors such as age, gender,
experience in the law, work experience in the ministry in question, work experience in
another ministries, management experience in the private sector, research experience
in academia, and experience in journalism as the personal characteristics of the cabinet
members.3
For example, in the 1960s, the age of Korean ministers tended to be lower because
large numbers of young military personnel entered the cabinet. However, since
democratization, the age of ministers has tended to be higher. The length of tenure of
old ministers who have a wide range of experience can be compared to that of ambitious
young ministers who have introduced innovative policy initiatives. To take another
example, the number of female cabinet members has been gradually increasing in both
Korea and the United States. It is a matter of interest whether the tenure length of
female cabinet members will be longer than that of male cabinet members (Berlinski,
Dewan & Dowding, 2007).
Experience in the government sector and qualification as a lawyer are also note-
worthy factors. Of 30 ministers and presidential staff who were initially appointed by
the Park Geun-hye administration, there were 14 people with bureaucratic experience,
and five people who had legal qualifications.4 As the private sector in Korea has
grown, in many cases prominent CEOs of companies have been appointed as ministers.5
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3. Berlinski, Dewan, and Dowding (2007) regard age and gender as the main social demographic
characteristics defining the personal characteristics of the minister. Heclo (1978) divides
the career path of ministers into four areas: the private sector, academia, bureaucracy, and
elected office. Cohen (1986) separates the legal sector from the private sector, and Hahm,
Jung, and Lee (2013) separately consider experience in journalism. In addition, Lewis
(2008) divides high-ranking officials’ experience in government into experience in the
given ministry as well as in other ministries.
4. “Male officials from Seoul National University, Sungkyunkwan University, hold a large
majority,” Hankook ilbo, February 21, 2013.
In the United States, there have been a lot of secretaries who were recruited from the
private sector, but more CEOs were appointed to the cabinet in the George W. Bush
administration than in others (Micklethwait & Wooldridge, 2004).6 In addition, scholars
who have committed themselves to research in universities or other institutions and
journalists who have had extensive experience reporting on public affairs have joined
cabinets. It is necessary to analyze whether they are able to perform ministerial tasks
that are significantly different from their original jobs.
Political Characteristics of the Cabinet Member
Political characteristics of the cabinet member may likewise affect the length of
tenure. Berlinski, Dewan, and Dowding (2007) analyze the effects of the political
characteristics of the minister, such as the role a minister may have had in the cabinet
before assuming his or her current position, the rank of the minister in the cabinet, and
whether he or she has been an unelected peer. Modifying the framework of their
analysis, this article adds legislative experiences in congress, experiences as a head of
local government or as a local councilor, experiences as a member of a presidential
staff, and experiences as a cabinet member to the list of variables.7
Experiences in the legislative branch and local government certainly count as
political characteristics. Experiences as an elected member of the legislative branch
can prepare a cabinet member to tackle a wide range of administrative tasks and political
issues. In principle, members of the legislative branch hold ministerial offices in the
parliamentary system. It is an open question how experience as an elected member of
the legislative branch may affect the performance of cabinet members in the presidential
system that Korea and the United States adopt. Experience as a head of local government
or as a local councilor should have an impact on a minister’s capabilities, since a local
government can be regarded as a microcosm of the national administration. Moreover,
heads of local government and local councilors provide checks on each other, politically
negotiating and compromising. It is a matter of interest whether these political experi-
ences affect the length of tenure of cabinet members.
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5. “Minister Namgoong Suek: A computer professional experienced in Hyundai Electronics and
Samsung SDS,” Maeil Business, December 22, 1998; “Star CEO Chin Dae-je, communica-
tion minister,” Korea Economic Daily, February 28, 2003.
6. George W. Bush was the first U.S. president with an MBA, and he appointed three secretaries
who were ex-chief executives in his first cabinet.
7. Berlinski, Dewan, & Dowding’s (2007) analysis is based on the British parliamentary system.
Consequently, their framework is not appropriate for the analysis of Korean ministers.
Moe (1985) argues that presidents appoint their staff and cabinet members using
political criteria, and as a result, presidential staff and secretaries are highly politicized
positions. In Korea and the United States, as the influence of the presidential staff has
steadily grown, the number of ministers who have experience as members of a presi-
dential staff has risen (Jung, 2001; Park, 2007).8 It is common for them to have person-
ally intimate relationships with the president and to communicate with the president
based on the knowledge of work processes that they have acquired. In Korea, it often
happens that one minister moves to the position of another minister. This state of
affairs has been heavily criticized, referred to as “revolving door appointments” by the
media. Berlinski, Dewan, and Dowding (2007) regard a minister’s previous work in
the cabinet as a vital variable among the political characteristics. Cabinet ministers
undertake tasks not only to lead their own ministry but also to assist the president.
Therefore, the duties of ministers can be politically oriented (Keman, 1991; Marsh &
Smith, 2000; Jung, Moon & Hahm, 2008).
Characteristics of the President
The power to appoint cabinet members is granted to the president, and so the char-
acteristics related to the president can play a significant role in the tenure length of
cabinet members. In this article, variables such as the president’s term, the time during
the presidency at which the president appoints the minister, the president’s ideology,
whether the president and the cabinet member come from the same region or not, the
president’s share of votes earned in the presidential election, and the ruling party’s 
proportion of seats in the legislature are reviewed.
For example, Cohen (1986) shows that whether the president is newly elected or
reelected affects the tenure length of secretaries. Berlinski, Dewan, and Dowding
(2007) analyze the tenure length of ministers in relation to the term currently being
served by the prime minister. They find that when the prime minister is in the second
or third term, the tenure length of ministers tends to be shorter.
Next, the time during the presidency at which the president appoints a cabinet
member is one of the characteristics related to the president. Light (1982) points out
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8. For example, U.S. national security advisor Henry Kissinger was appointed as the secretary
of state in 1973. Many years later, President Nixon admitted that he had not wanted to appoint
Henry Kissinger as secretary of state. For one, Nixon thought that the position called for
someone with economic expertise, and he felt that while Kissinger had no competitors in
geopolitics, he was weak on economics. For another, Nixon believed that Kissinger was
better at dealing with big issues than managing the department of state (Isaacson, 1992).
that the president has enormous capital at the beginning of the presidency. In particular,
presidential power is the strongest in the “honeymoon” period. Thus, the president
wants to control bureaucrats in accordance with the new government policy goals in
the early stage of the presidency.
The ideology of the president is another variable that may be related to the tenure
length of cabinet members. In other words, whether the president has conservative or
liberal tendencies can play a role in the tenure length of cabinet members. Lewis
(2008) uses the ideological tendency of the president as one of variables in analyzing
political appointment of bureaucrats. However, because it is difficult to measure the
president’s ideology accurately, Berlinski, Dewan, and Dowding (2007) consider the
party to which the prime minister belongs as a factor that can affect the tenure length
of ministers.
Whether the president and the cabinet member come from the same region or not
can also affect the tenure length of cabinet members (Cohen, 1986). Korean administra-
tions have often faced criticism for the large number of ministers from the president’s
home province who are appointed to the cabinet. It is necessary to analyze the tenure
length of those ministers as compared to the tenure length of ministers from other
regions.
The popularity of the president can be a variable that may affect the tenure length
of cabinet members (Wood & Marchbanks, 2008). Because it is difficult to measure
the degree of a president’s popularity, Cohen (1986) uses the president’s success or
failure as a variable. Krause & Cohen (1997) measure the president’s popularity by
using presidential approval ratings in Gallup polls. However, in Korea it is very difficult
to find objective indicators that can measure the popularity of a president. Therefore,
this article measures the share of votes a president won in the presidential election.
The proportion of congressional seats that are occupied by the ruling party can
affect the tenure length of cabinet members, which is a similar variable to that of the
popularity of the president. The ruling party to which the president belongs supports
the president in the face of the opposition party in the legislature. Wood & Marchbanks
(2008) argue that if conflicts between the executive branch and the legislative branch
become larger, the tenure length of political appointees decreases. On the other hand,
Berlinski, Dewan, and Dowding (2007) show that whether the ruling party occupies
more than 55% of parliamentary seats does not affect the tenure length of ministers.
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METHODS OF ANALYSIS
Data Collection
This article gathered data on the 953 Korean ministers and the 259 U.S. secretaries
who were between August 1948 and January 2013.9 In the case of Korea, the range of
the analysis includes ministers appointed from the Rhee Syngman administration in
August 1948 to the end of the Lee Myung-bak administration in 2013. Korean ministers
are appointed by the president with the prime minister’s recommendation. However,
following the National Assembly confirmation hearing process that was adopted in
2005, the National Assembly must hold a hearing before the president’s appointment.10
Nevertheless, there the president’s appointment does not have to be ratified by the
National Assembly, and the hearing reports are not legally binding (Choi & Lee,
2006).
In the case of the United States, the range of the analysis includes secretaries
appointed from the Truman administration in 1948 to the first term of the Obama
administration in 2013. The U.S. Constitution does not specifically address the topic
of the cabinet and secretaries. However, it does state that the principal officials of the
government should be appointed by the president with the advice and consent of the
Senate. After a hearing of the Senate and securing approval from a majority of the
total members in plenary sessions, the ratification is finalized (Choi & Lee, 2006). In
other words, the U.S. president’s appointment of secretaries requires the Senate’s 
consent. This is a major difference between Korea and the U.S.
Profiles of Korean ministers are provided by newspapers such as Dong-a ilbo,
Hankook ilbo, Maeil Business, and Hankyoreh. In addition, profiles of ministers can be
obtained through the ministry’s website, and those of ministers who have experience
as legislators can be found on the website of the Parliamentarian’s Society of the
Republic of Korea. Plus, this article makes a database of Korean minister profiles,
referring to the Encyclopedia of Korean Culture published by the Academy of Korean
Studies. Profile databases of secretaries of the United States are mainly based on the
data of Grossman (2010). Grossman provides profiles of the U.S. secretaries from
1789 to 2010. This article also gathered profiles of secretaries through the websites of
the U.S. government.
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9. Opinions are divided on the scope of the category of minister. In this article, the category is
limited to Korean cabinet members and heads of U.S. federal executive departments in the
cabinet.
10. See article 94 of the Korean Constitution, article 31-2 of the State Public Officials Act.
Study Design: The Proportional Hazards Model11
The factors that affect the tenure length of cabinet members can be used to design
an empirical model that can be represented by the following equation.
Tipf = α + Xipβ′ + Zipfγ′ + εipf,
where Tipf is the tenure length of cabinet member i at time f in government p, Xip is 
the personal and political characteristics of cabinet member at the start of his or her
tenure, and Zipf is the performance vector during and the end of his or her tenure.
Because the performance of a cabinet member is related to his or her personal and
political characteristics and to the president’s characteristics, Z is implicitly a function
of X. Thus, the characteristics of the cabinet member and the president affect the
tenure length of cabinet member directly by the vector β′ and indirectly by Z.
Although a model in which the tenure length of cabinet members is linearly related
to the characteristics of the cabinet member and the president is suggested, there is 
a limit to ordinary least-squares regression when the length of time is a dependent
variable. In other words, because the tenure length of cabinet member becomes a
dependent variable, we cannot assume that errors follow a normal distribution. In
order to address this problem, duration models can be used (Box-Steffensmeier &
Johns, 1997). The duration model concentrates on the hazard rate, which in our case
would be the immediate risk of a cabinet member’s term ending. In this model, the
hazard ratio becomes a dependent variable, and factors that may affect the hazard ratio
act as independent variables for regression analysis.
This study uses the proportional hazards model of Cox (1972). In medical statistics,
the purpose of the model is to explore the relationship between the survival of a patient
and some variables. Here we replace the survival of a patient with the survival of a
cabinet member. For the purposes of analyzing the tenure length of cabinet members,
the hazard ratio of the proportional hazards model means the probability of the cabinet
member’s tenure ending. For example, the hazard ratio of cabinet member i in govern-
ment p can be represented by the following equation.
λipt = λ0(t) × exp(Xipθ′)
In this equation, λ0(t) is the hazard ratio when all measurements of the characteristics
that may affect the tenure of cabinet member are 0, so it is the baseline hazard of the
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11. See the analysis model of Berlinski, Dewan, and Dowding (2007).
cabinet member at the time of t; X is a vector related to the personal and political char-
acteristics of the cabinet member and to the characteristics of the president. The vector
θ used here is derived from estimating the effect of the personal and political character-
istics of the cabinet member and the characteristics of the president. For the statistical
analysis, PASW statistics 18.0 package was used.
RESULTS OF EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 shows the basic descriptive statistics of the 953 ministers of Korea and the
259 secretaries of the United States from 1948 to 2013. The average tenure of ministers
in Korea is 13.84 months, but the average tenure of secretaries in the United States is
35.89 months. The maximum tenure is 90 months in Korea and 96 months in the United
States. The minimum tenure is one month in both Korea and the United States.12 In
Korea, the percentage of ministers who served the minimum is 6.4%, compared to
1.2% in the United States.
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12. If the minister’s tenure was less than one month, it is treated as one month.
Table 1. Variables and Descriptive Statistics
Mean
Variable Definition Unit (std. dev.)
Korea U.S.
Tenure length Period served as a cabinet member Month 13.84 35.89(10.85) (21.81)
Age Age Year 53.58 53.44(6.57) (7.68)
Gender Gender Female=1, male=0 0.04 0.10
Lawyer Whether qualified to practice law Yes=1, no=0 0.10 0.48
Ministry/ Whether has previous work 
Department experience in the ministry/ Yes=1, no=0 0.39 0.34department
Other Whether has work experience in ministries/ other ministries/departments Yes=1, no=0 0.57 0.44departments
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Mean
Variable Definition Unit (std. dev.)
Korea U.S.
Private sector Whether has work experience in Yes=1, no=0 0.14 0.46the private sector
Academia Whether has research experience Yes=1, no=0 0.22 0.19in universities or other institutions
Journalism Whether has experience as a Yes=1, no=0 0.08 0.02journalist
Experience as a member of the Number of terms 
Legislature National Assembly (Korea), (Korea), years served 0.62 1.96experience as a member of Senate (U.S.)13 (1.16) (5.23)and House (U.S.)
Local Whether has experience as a head 
government of local government or as a local Yes=1, no=0 0.13 0.24councilor14
Presidential Whether has experiences as a Yes=1, no=0 0.23 0.15staff presidential staff member
Cabinet Whether has experience as a Yes=1, no=0 0.22 0.07member minister/secretary
Term Term currently being served by the First term=0, second 0.29 0.32president and more term=1
Appointment Years served by the appointing Year15 1.41 0.71timing president (1.53) (1.06)
President’s President’s political leanings Liberal=1, 0.22 0.43ideology conservative=0
Whether the president and the 
Region cabinet member come from the Yes=1, no=0 0.20 0.21
same region
Presidential President’s share of votes earned Percentage (%) 60.35 51.92election in the presidential election (22.57) (5.38)
The ruling Proportion of seats of the ruling Percentage (%) 52.56 50.18party party in the congress (12.98) (9.35) 
13. While Korea has a unicameral parliament system, the United States has a bicameral system.
Korean national assemblymen and assemblywomen serve four-year terms. U.S. senators
serve for a term of six years, and U.S. congressmen and congresswomen serve a term of two
years. For this reason, it is not reasonable if the number of terms is used to gauge experience
in the legislative branch in the United States. Thus, for the United States, the total number
of years served as a legislator is used as a measurement. However, if the period is less than 
Average age is 53.58 years old in Korea and 53.44 years in the United States. The
percentage of Korean female ministers is 4%, and that of female secretaries in the
United States is 10%. On average, 10% of Korean ministers have been qualified as
lawyers and 14% of Korean ministers have management experience in the private sector.
In the U.S., 48% of secretaries have legal qualifications, and 46% have experience in
the private sector.
As for political characteristics of cabinet members, 13% of Korean ministers and
24% of U.S secretaries have experience in local government. On the other hand, 22%
of Korean ministers have experience as a minister, compared to only 7% of U.S. secre-
taries.
With this data, we can also calculate basic statistics pertaining to the characteristics
of a president. For instance, 29% of Korean ministers are appointed after the second or
greater term of the presidency, while 32% of U.S. secretaries are. On average, 22% of
Korean ministers have been appointed by a liberal president. This compares with 43%
of U.S. secretaries appointed by liberal president.
The number of presidents that served during the period analyzed is 10 in Korea and
12 in the United States. The characteristics of cabinet members under these presidents
are summarized in table 2 and table 3. In Korea, as shown in table 2, the longest average
ministerial tenure is 18.83 months in the Park Chung-hee administration, and the shortest
is 3.18 months in the Yun Bo-seon administration. The highest average age is 58.65
years old during the Kim Dae-jung administration, and the lowest is 48.35 years old in
the Park Chung-hee administration. There were no female ministers in the Yun Bo-seon
administration or the Park Chung-hee administration. The most extensive experience
as legislators is shown in the Yun Bo-seon administration, during which the ministers
had an average of 2.44 terms served as assemblymen.
In the United States (table 3), the longest average tenure of secretaries is 54.92
months in the Kennedy administration, and the shortest is 13.33 months in the Ford
administration. The highest average age is 57.19 years old in the Obama administra-
tion, and the lowest is 47.46 years old in the Kennedy administration. There were no
female secretaries in the Truman, Kennedy, Johnson, or Nixon administrations. The
secretaries in the George H. W. Bush administration show the widest experience as
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one year, it is considered as one year.
14. The concept of local autonomy in the United States is very different from that in Korea. In
this study, a governor of a state in the United States is considered as one of the heads of local
government. And experience as local councilors includes experience as state legislators.
15. The ordinal number of the year in which the president appointed the cabinet member is 
displayed. For example, the first year of the presidency = 0, and the second year of the
presidency = 1.
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Table 2. Average Characteristics of Ministers by Government in Korea
Variable
Rhee Syngman Yun Bo-seon Park Chung-hee Choi Kyu-hah Chun Doo-hwan
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
Tenure length 12.80 3.18 18.83 9.32 16.58
Age 51.90 53.94 48.35 54.50 52.12
Female 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.01
Lawyer 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.07 0.07
Ministry 0.42 0.32 0.38 0.32 0.38
Other ministries 0.54 0.62 0.78 0.79 0.63
Private sector 0.23 0.18 0.08 0.14 0.16
Academia 0.23 0.12 0.24 0.32 0.18
Journalism 0.04 0.21 0.05 0.07 0.08
Legislature 0.25 2.44 0.38 0.14 0.52
Local government 0.16 0.29 0.12 0.07 0.18
Presidential staff 0.02 0.00 0.13 0.18 0.28
Minister 0.17 0.29 0.30 0.18 0.24
Region 0.37 0.09 0.12 0.04 0.27
Observations 132 34 206 28 105 
Variable
Roh Tae-woo Kim Young-sam Kim Dae-jung Roh Moo-hyun Lee Myung-bak
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
Tenure length 11.98 10.46 10.81 13.95 17.37
Age 55.95 56.03 58.65 55.69 58.02
Female 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.15
Lawyer 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.08
Ministry 0.34 0.34 0.45 0.44 0.46
Other ministries 0.58 0.45 0.42 0.35 0.33
Private sector 0.08 0.08 0.19 0.19 0.12
Academia 0.21 0.23 0.20 0.22 0.25
Journalism 0.15 0.17 0.01 0.05 0.06
Legislature 0.87 0.96 0.66 0.36 0.73
Local government 0.13 0.14 0.06 0.04 0.10
Presidential staff 0.34 0.32 0.31 0.35 0.40
Minister 0.19 0.26 0.18 0.13 0.08
Region 0.19 0.18 0.22 0.18 0.21
Observations 107 116 96 77 52
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Table 3. Average Characteristics of Secretaries by Government in the United States
Variable
Truman Eisenhower Kennedy Johnson Nixon Ford
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
Tenure length 37.81 46.70 54.92 18.40 28.71 13.33
Age 53.75 55.15 47.46 49.93 51.90 51.08
Female 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08
Lawyer 0.50 0.35 0.62 0.40 0.39 0.50
Department 0.75 0.30 0.23 0.67 0.32 0.33
Other departments 0.50 0.40 0.46 0.40 0.35 0.58
Private sector 0.31 0.70 0.38 0.60 0.42 0.42
Academia 0.00 0.10 0.23 0.33 0.23 0.25
Journalism 0.00 0.20 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00
Legislature 0.50 0.65 0.77 0.13 0.94 1.50
Local government 0.25 0.35 0.31 0.00 0.29 0.17
Presidential staff 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.20 0.06 0.17
Secretary 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.17
Region 0.13 0.10 0.23 0.20 0.16 0.17
Observations 16 20 13 15 31 12
Variable
Carter Reagan George H. W. Bush Clinton George W. Bush Obama
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
Tenure length 25.73 40.09 29.39 44.69 40.68 40.40
Age 52.23 54.12 54.00 52.72 57.00 57.19
Female 0.23 0.09 0.11 0.17 0.18 0.25
Lawyer 0.64 0.45 0.33 0.66 0.44 0.50
Department 0.18 0.30 0.17 0.38 0.26 0.31
Other departments 0.45 0.48 0.56 0.24 0.56 0.31
Private sector 0.32 0.58 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.19
Academia 0.32 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.21 0.19
Journalism 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Legislature 1.77 1.55 5.56 4.55 1.65 3.13
Local government 0.18 0.12 0.28 0.24 0.26 0.38
Presidential staff 0.05 0.21 0.44 0.14 0.24 0.19
Secretary 0.14 0.09 0.11 0.03 0.06 0.00
Region 0.14 0.33 0.33 0.24 0.15 0.38
Observations 22 33 18 29 34 16 
legislators, during which the secretaries had an average of 5.56 years of experience as
a congressman or congresswoman.
The Proportional Hazards Model Analysis
According to the three hypotheses set above, the personal and political characteristics
of the cabinet member and the characteristics of the president may affect the hazard
ratios for the tenure of cabinet member. If the hazard ratio is higher, the tenure of cabinet
member will be shorter, while if the hazard ratio is lower, the tenure of cabinet member
will become longer. Table 4 provides the results of the hazard ratios for the tenure of
cabinet member.
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Table 4. The Determinants of Ministerial/Secretarial Tenures: Hazard Ratios from Cox Models
Characteristics Variable Korea United States
Age 1.099 (0.006) 0.999 (0.010)
Gender 0.784 (0.178) 0.864 (0.227)
Lawyer 1.158 (0.111) 1.042 (0.153)
Personal characteristics Ministry / Department 0.853 (0.075)* 1.081 (0.156)
of cabinet member Other ministries / Other departments 1.132 (0.082) 0.985 (0.142)
Private sector 1.023 (0.099) 0.843 (0.156)
Academia 0.945 (0.087) 0.908 (0.178)
Journalism 0.815 (0.128) 0.491 (0.527)
Legislature 1.111 (0.031)** 1.020 (0.013)
Political characteristics Local government 1.377 (0.103)** 0.911 (0.175)
of cabinet member Presidential staff 0.921 (0.083) 1.155 (0.200)
Minister / Secretary 1.122 (0.090) 1.466 (0.276)
Term 0.490 (0.100)** 1.588 (0.172)**
Appointment timing 1.093 (0.025)** 1.429 (0.074)**
Characteristics of Ideology 1.269 (0.090)** 0.929 (0.199)
president Region 1.006 (0.083) 0.834 (0.170)
Presidential election 1.003 (0.003) 1.042 (0.016)*
Ruling party 1.003 (0.002) 1.009 (0.012)
Observations 953 259 
Standard deviation is given in parentheses. * p <0.05, ** p <0.01.
See table 1 for units and measurement of the variables.
Factors Affecting the Tenure of Ministers in Korea
As shown in table 4, the personal and political characteristics of Korean ministers
and the characteristics of a president have statistically significant effects on their
tenure.
First, among the personal characteristics of ministers, previous work experience 
in the ministry to which the minister belongs affects the length of ministerial tenure.
Ministers who have work experience in the ministry have a hazard rate that is 15% lower
than those who do not. In other words, the ministers who have previous experience in
the ministry to which they belong tend to have longer tenures. Also, the average tenure
of ministers who have experience in the ministry is 14.67 months, but that of ministers
who do not is 13.31 months. If ministers have experience in their ministry before the
appointment, it is likely that they have strong expertise in the field. In addition, it
might be easier for the minister to lead and control the ministry because he or she is
familiar with the organization and its personnel.
Second, among the political characteristics of minister, experience as a legislator
and a head of local government affects the length of ministerial tenure. If the minister
has served one more term as a member of the National Assembly, the hazard rate
becomes 11% higher. In other words, the more times a minister has been elected as a
legislator, the shorter his or her ministerial tenure becomes. The average tenure of
ministers who have served in the National Assembly is only 11.37 months, whereas
that of ministers who have not is 14.79 months. Although the Korean Constitution 
is based on the presidential system, it has elements of the parliamentary system, one
feature of which is allowing a legislator to hold ministerial offices.16 Thus, a large
number of members of the National Assembly want to gain experience in the executive
branch, since it can be a springboard to a higher political career. However, there can be
harmful side effects if legislators hold offices in the cabinet, since they are likely to
perform ministerial duties with an eye to procuring political advantages. A president
may prefer ministers who perform their duties in line with his or her wishes to those
who act in light of their own politics. In addition, ministers who have been members
of the National Assembly tend to resign during their tenure in order to run for office
(Sung, 2014).
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16. Article 43 of the Korean constitution provides that members of the National Assembly
shall not concurrently hold any other office prescribed by act, and article 29 of the National
Assembly Act lists the offices that may not be concurrently held. However, cabinet members
may hold the position of the national assemblyman or assemblywoman concurrently,
because it is not listed in article 29.
The hazard rates of ministers who have experience in local government are 38%
higher than those who do not. Like those ministers with legislative experience, ministers
who have experience as heads of local government or as local councilors tend to be
politically motivated. The average tenure of ministers who have experience in local
government is 11.09 months, which compares with the 14.23 months of ministers who
do not have experience in local government. A head of local government wields
immense power, so much as to be called “the lord of the region.”17 It is common for
ministers who have experience as heads of local government or as local councilors to
think of the position of minister as an opportunity to build their political careers and
leap into higher positions, which suggests that the political ambitions of a minister
may have adverse effects on ministerial tenure.
Third, the characteristics of the president who appoints ministers affect the length
of ministerial tenure. Among the characteristics related to the president, the president’s
term, the time during the presidency at which a minister is appointed, and the ideology
of the president affect the hazard rate. In particular, whether the president is in the first
or second or additional term makes a significant difference. If the president is in the
second or more term, the hazard rate is 51% lower than for a president in the first
term. This difference may result from the institutional factor of the political system.
The Korean Constitution has been amended several times related to the political system.
After it was amended in 1987, presidents could not be reelected. Thus, the characteristics
of the single-term presidency system may affect the relatively short tenure of ministers
in Korea.
In addition, once the term of the presidency exceeds one year, the hazard rate of
ministers increases 9%. This shows that ministers who are appointed at the beginning
of the president’s term tend to have longer tenures than ministers appointed later. In
Korea, presidential terms vary from four to seven years due to the constitutional
amendments. The tenure of ministers can be affected by the length of the presidential
term. Consequently, the term of the presidency may be an institutional factor that
affects the tenure of ministers.
The ideology of the president also affects the hazard rate of a minister’s tenure. The
hazard rate of ministers appointed by a president who belongs to a relatively liberal
party is 27% higher than those appointed by a conservative president. In this study,
only three presidents, Yun Bo-seon, Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun, belong to liberal
parties, and the average ministerial tenure of Yun Bo-seon’s presidency was only 3.18
months. These facts may make it seem like the tenure of ministers in liberal governments
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17. “Head of local government has enormous power but no responsibility,” Yonhap News,
April 21, 2010.
is shorter than in fact it is.
To summarize, in Korea, three attributes including the personal and political char-
acteristics of minister, and the characteristics of president affect the hazard rate of a
minister’s tenure.
Factors Affecting the Tenure of Secretaries in the United States
Table 4 shows the results of the analysis of secretarial tenure in the United States as
well. In the United States, only the characteristics of the president among the three
characteristics affect the tenure of secretaries.
First, none of the eight variables pertaining to the personal characteristics of a secre-
tary (including age, gender, legal qualifications, experience in the department or other
departments, and experience in the private sector, academia, and journalism) affect the
hazard rate.
Second, the political characteristics of secretaries do not affect their tenure. Although
experiences in the National Assembly and local government increase the hazard rate
for Korean ministers, these factors do not significantly affect secretarial tenure in the
United States.
Third, as in Korea, the characteristics related to the president have an impact on the
tenure of secretaries. Among the variables of the characteristics related to the president,
the president’s term, the point during the presidency at which the secretary is appointed,
and the president’s earned share of votes in the presidential election affect the length
of secretarial tenure.
The hazard rate of secretaries who are appointed by a president in the second term
is 59% higher than that of secretaries appointed by a president in the first term. Since
the U.S. Constitution allows for the reelection of the president, a president in the first
term usually spends a fair amount of time preparing for the next presidential election.
As a result, the lame-duck period of a president in the first term tends to be relatively
short. If the president succeeds in getting reelected, secretaries will get another political
opportunity. For this reason, secretaries will do their best to perform their duties until
the president launches the reelection campaign. This could be an important cause of
the longer tenure of secretaries appointed by a president in the first term. On the other
hand, a president in the second term can quickly enter a lame-duck period because the
president’s third term is prohibited by the U.S. Constitution. This may have an impact
on the tenure of secretaries appointed by a president in the second term.
In addition, as the years of a president’s term pass, the hazard rate of secretaries
increases by 43%. Compared to the hazard rate of Korean ministers, which increases
9% annually, the hazard rate of secretaries is much. The average tenure of secretaries
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in the United States is 35.89 months, which amounts to just about 12 months less than
the 48 months of a presidential term. These high average tenures of secretaries implies
that a significant number of secretaries keep their position during the four-year presidency.
It can be inferred that if the secretary is replaced in the middle of the presidential term,
the newly appointed secretary usually leaves the position at the end of the president’s
term.
Finally, a remarkable result of the statistical analysis is that the hazard rate of secre-
taries increases 4.2% if the president wins a 1% higher share of the votes in the presi-
dential election. This result suggests that the president who is supported by a number
of groups may need to politically compensate these supporters. The secretary is a top-
level position that is bestowed as a reward for political support. The president may
consider frequent cabinet reshuffles if the president has a large number of personnel to
be politically taken care of.
CONCLUSION
To sum up, a number of personal and political characteristics of cabinet members
affect their tenure in Korea, while they do not affect their tenure in the United States, a
difference that perhaps owes to the fact Korea’s political system is a mixed presidential-
parliamentary one. It is noteworthy that the analysis of the tenure of ministers in
Britain, which has a parliamentary system, likewise concludes that the personal and
political characteristics of ministers affect their tenure (Berlinski, Dewan, & Dowding,
2007).
There are some positive aspects of a short tenure for cabinet members. Frequent
cabinet reshuffles mean that the government is more likely to take responsibility for
policy failures and pay heed to people’s urgent needs. However, short terms may trigger
political instability and frequent policy changes. This may also exacerbate the public’s
distrust in government. There is a possibility that a vicious cycle will emerge. Thus,
the excessively short tenure of Korean ministers may be a cause for concern.
The findings of this article may be limited owing to the inherent limitations of 
statistical analysis. There is important information that can be missed by quantitative
methods. Qualitative factors such as the government’s policy failures and social crises
or unrest may affect the tenure of cabinet members, but they are difficult to capture in
the form of quantitative variables. Furthermore, there are limitations on collecting
data. Because a credible database of the personal data of cabinet members is difficult
to compile, the profiles an analysis such as this draws on may not be accurate.
However, this article does make it clear that the theories and practices of public
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administration and political science in the United States may not be applicable in
Korea. In the future, a more expansive framework that would explain the tenure of
Korean ministers in more detail needs to be developed. This article can serve as a
foundation for future studies.
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